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L.: Corporations--State's Right to Amend or Repeal Corporate Charters
RECENT CASE COMMENTS
CORPORATIONS -

STATE'S RIGHT TO AMEND OR REPEAL CORPO-
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restricted and the
sioner. While it was in his hands, the board of directors drew up
a plan of reorganization which was accepted by the commissioner.
By this plan each stockholder was assessed fifty dollars per share.
The defendant failing to pay his assessment, his stock was sold,
resulting in an assessment deficiency for which recovery was
sought. The plaintiff justified the assessment under the code provision which confers plenary powers on the banking commissioner,1
and under the 1935 statute which purports to bind a dissenting
stockholder to a reorganization sponsored by two-thirds of the
stockholders and approved by the commissioner.2 Held, that the
defendant's contract with the bank did not include liability for
such an assessment3 notwithstanding the state's reserved right to
repeal or amend corporate charters. 4 farshall County Bank v.
Wk7eeling Dollar Savings Trust Co.'
The case qualifies the principle that any amendment to a corporate charter by the state becomes a part of the contract between
the corporation and its stockholders by reason of advance consent
given by the stockholder because he has constructive notice of the
state's right to amend. 6 The limitations applied are (1) that the
RATE

CHrARTERS

-

LimUTATiONS.0 -

* The case in comment appeared in the advance sheets subsequent to the
writer's completion and submission for printing of the note to be found on

page 125 of the February issue of this QUARTEnLY. It would have fitted well
into that discussion. However, it is to be noted that the note dealt primarily
with the subject of amendments from the standpoint of what amendments the
state might authorize the corporation to add to its charter, whereas the present
comment deals with a case in which the state is acting directly by statute and
not through express amendment to the charter. The West Virginia cases there
cited really deal with the phase of the subject here presented. However, the
limitations on the corporation and on the state are phrased the same by the
cases as may be seen by comparing the limitations set forth in the principal
case with the analysis of those in the note.
1 W. VA. REV. CODE (MAichie, 1937) c. 31, art. 8, § 29.
2 Id. c. 31, art. 8, § 43 (W. Va. Acts 1935, c. 13).
3 The court found that this assessment was warranted neither by W. VA.
CONST. art. II, § 6, because that section applies only in case of liquidation, nor
by W. VA. REV. CODE (Michie, 1937) c. 31, art. 8, § 14 because that section
applies only to restore impaired capital of a going concern.
4 W. VA. REV. CODE (Michie, 1937) c. 31, art. 1, § 8.
5 193 S. E. 915 (W. Va. 1937).
a Tabler v. Higginbotham, 110 W. Va. 9, 14, 156 S. E. 751 (1931); Germer
v. Oil & Gas Co., 60 W. Va. 143, 152, 54 S. E. 509 (1906); Cross v. W. Va. C.
& P. Ry. Co., 37 W. Va. 342, 345, 16 S. E. 587 (1892); Cross v. W. Va. C. &
P. Ry. Co., 35 W. Va. 174, 177, 12 S. E. 1071 (1891); Davis v. Louisville Gas
& Electric Co., 16 Del. Ch. 157, 142 At. 654 (1928).
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power to amend or repeal corporate charters "may not be exercised
directly or indirectly to increase materially the liability of an unwilling stockholder", 7 (2) that the "power should be restricted to
those amendments only in which the state has a public interest",'and (3) that it cannot be used to permit the majority stockholders
"to force on the minority a material change in the enterprise"."
The limitations defined are those commonly found in the cases
limiting the power. 10
The court avoids the difficulty of distinguishing a public purpose from a private one" by assuming the rights affected to be
private. A public interest in the reorganization and continued
operation of banks would seem to follow from the relation which
they bear to the fiscal affairs of the people and the revenues of
the state, 2 and if the amendment were proper from that standpoint
it might be construed not a material change.' 3 Therefore, a reorganization of the bank under the recent statute in and of itself
might reasonably be said to bind the stockholder as part of his
contract.
The case might have been decided without adverting to the
principle of limitation of amending power. It is arguable that
there is nothing in the statute authorizing the commissioner to approve a reorganization which requires a nwndatory assessment.
Where the legislature has seen fit to require an assessment it has
expressly incorporated in the statute the right to assess. 14 Since
one of the recognized advantages of doing business as a stockholder
is limited liability, it may be inferred that where an assessment
is not expressly provided, it is not authorized. The court, however,
7 7 FLETCHER, CYCLOPEDIA OF THE LAW OF PRIvATE CoRPoRATIoNs (Rev. ed.
1931) §§ 3688, 3695. But the amendment may make the burden on the stockholder heavier. Tabler v. Higginbotham, 110 IV. Va. 9, 156 S. E. 509 (1931);
7 FLETCHER, CORPORATIONs §§ 3663, 3695.
8 Gary v. St. Joe Mining Co., 32 Utah 497, 91 Pae. 369 (1907) ; Hinckley v.
Schwarzschild, 107 App. Div. 470, 95 N. Y. S. 357 (1905); but see Davis v.
Louisville Gas & Electric Co., 16 Del. Ch. 157, 142 Atl. 654 (1928). 7 FLETcMR,
CoRPORATioNs § 3679.
9 Natu ech v. Irving, 2 Coop. T. Cott. 358, 47 Eng. Rep. 1196 (1824); Gow,
PARTNERSHIP (2d ed. 1830) 576; Zabriskie v. Ry. Co., 18 N. J. Eq. 178 (1867);
7 FLET0HER, CORPORATIONS § 3684.
30 See notes 7, 8, and 9 supra.

-1 Davis v.. Louisville Gas & Electric Co., 16 Del. Ch. 157, 142 Atl. 654

(1928).
12

Timmons v. Trust Co, 114 W. Va. 618, 620, 173 S. E. 79 (1933); 1

MICHIE, BANKS AND BANKING (1931) § 2.
23

Bx parte Pittman, 31 Nev. 43, 99 Pac. 700 (1909) ; 3 MICHIE, BA.ms

AND

BANKING § 7.
14 See note 3 o2pra.
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in order to clarify the situation for future legislative action, holds
in effect that if the assessment had been authorized, the statute
would not be valid retroactively 15 because such a statute would
by way of amendment materially increase the liability of the stockholder -in other words, deprive him of his property without due
process of law. The case, therefore, forcibly illustrates the contention that the only real and valid limitation on the state's right
to amend or repeal corporate charters is the due process clause of
the federal constitution.
F. W. L.
EQUITY -

SEQUESTRATION

OF

PERSONAL

PROPERTY

PENDING

FINAL LITIGATION TO DETERMNE OWNERSHIP.- Suit instituted by
X and other heirs of Y against A, administratrix and widow of Y,
and B company, her surety. The bill alleges that Y owned Liberty
bonds at his death, about which time they came into the hands of
A, and prays that A be required to account for the bonds and restrained from disposing of them. A answered, alleging that bonds
were in her possession claiming them as a gift from Y and disclosing the details of the transfer. B company then gave notice of
a motion to require A to turn the bonds over to some person, whom
the court should name, to be held by him until ownership be determined. On return day of the notice B filed its answer, which
alleges that if the bonds be found to be a part of Y's estate, there
is "grave danger" that B would be liable for the bonds, especially
if A has disposed of the bonds and is unable to make an accounting,
for A is without assets from which a recovery could be had. The
verified answer then prayed that the court sequester the bonds.
Without further showing, the trial court granted the motion. Held,
one judge dissenting, that the trial court was in error in granting
an order of sequestration upon the grounds shown. Vangilder v.
Vangilder; United States Fidelity & Guaranty Co. v. 1angilder.'
Formerly, sequestration had its chief importance as a chancery
remedy whereby the property of a person, or of a corporation, was
seized by officers of the court of chancery to punish contempts or
to compel obedience to the order or decree of the court, final or
interlocutory. The modern importance of the sequestration pro15 Note that the similar statute affecting ordinary corporations expressly
negatives retroactive effect. W. VA. REv. CODE (Michie, 1937) c. 31, art. 1,

§ 3.

1193 S. E. 342 (W. Va. 1938).
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